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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

I

UNITED FACTORS,
)
a Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
vs.
Case No.
T. C. ASSOCIATES, INC.,
11022
a Corporation, and
HARRY R. ULMER, JR.,
PAUL J. SUGAR and
SAM HERSCOVITZ,
Defendants and Appellants,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT INCONSISTENT
WITH THE FACTS
Respondent controverts the following statements:
Page 2:
Judgment (57-58) was not granted upon oral
Motion but was based on the affidavit of Alvin I.
Smith (R. 46-47).
The relief sought is more than a reversal of the
Order (R. 54); Appellant is attempting to have the
judgment declared null and void and set aside.
Page 3:
1

Respondent denies there was any oral modification of the guaranty either as to amount or as to
accounts. The guarantees ( R. 25-28, Ex. B attached
to R. 21) were unlimited in amounts and appellant
agreed: "That the terms and conditions hereof can
in no wise be limited or without your (respondent's)
written consent."
The guarantees explicitly were to cover any account factored with the respondent arising out of
sales made prior to or after the date of execution.
Respondent disputes that the appellants did not
consent, accept or authorize the assignment of Evans
and Black Carpet Mills account to respondent. The
guarantees acknowledge liability thereunder upon
the Factor's acceptance of any assignment or transfer of an account receivable of a sale evidenced by
an invoice.
It must be emphasized that only the statements
of Mr. Vlahos in his agreement to Judge Jeppson
( R. 66, lines 21-24) raise the spurious claim that
the guarantees were limited to $10,000.00. The guarantees themselves ( R. 25-28) are unlimited as to
dollar amount. Mr. Herscovitz' affidavit (R. 46)
has no mention of a $10,000.00 limit, but on contrary reads: "That at the time of the signing of said
stipulation your affiant believed that the law was
such that he would be obligated for the entire
amount due and owing the plaintiff rather than the
amount that he signed as a guarantor" (emphasis
ours). We repeat, he signed no amount.
2

1

Although a summons was accepted by Mr. Vlahos, the judgment is based on filing of a complaint,
the appearance of the defendants through their attorney, by filing a motion to set aside default (R.
13-14) and a petition that "'each of the defendants,
in the interest of justice, be given an opportunity to
file their responsive pleadings". A complaint had
been furnished to Mr. Saperstein by plaintiff's counsel when counsel was advised of Mr. Vlahos' incapacity. Plaintiff's counsel did not resist the motion
and prepared the Order Setting Aside the Def a ult
and Vacating Judgment (R. 20), in which Order
the Court further ruled the defendants had entered
their appearance and granted them additional time
to August 2, 1966 in which to file an answere. The
answer ( R. 29-34) was filed for appellants on August 17, 1966.
Page 4:
When the motion to set aside the default was
filed, steps to have the receiver qualify were discontinued and counsel for the parties, together with
other counsel for creditors, attempted to find a solution to T. C. Associates' financial difficulties. An
attachment was made by another creditor which resulted in the corporation on July 28, 1966 filing a
petition for arrangement under Chapter XI under
the Bankruptcy Act. The arrangement was approved, but several months later when the debtor could
not meet the terms proposed by it, it was on its own
petition adjudged a bankrupt.
Page 5:
3

Respondent disputes the conclusions that there
was no consideration. Mr. Saperstein did not withdraw as attorney "shortly thereafter". From September 19, 1966 until July 25, 1967 he continued to
serve as appellants' attorney; during this ten month
period, and particularly after April 1, 1967, when
the balance was to be paid, it was only as a professional courtesy to Mr. Saperstein that the provisions
of the stipulation were not enforced. When he was
unsuccessful in securing a further extension of the
last payment, after contacting United Factor's officials directly, did he withdraw.
The stipulation ( R. 51, 52, 53) does not provide that all payments made by appellant were to
apply on the Bailey-Schmitz account. Both appellants agreed to make payments to apply against both
accounts; any dividends received from the Chapter
XI proceeding were to apply first against E & B
Carpet Mills, Inc. and the balance against BaileySchmi tz.
Page 6:
Counsel for appellants has not only misstated '
the above facts, but is deficient in his arithmetic.
According to the stipulation, if payments had
been made as agreed on April 1, 1967, a final pay·
rnent in the sum of $3,973.12 would have paid the
account in full.
4

1

Unpaid principal balance ____________________ 2, 736.54
Interest to April 1, 1967 ____________________ 747.68
Attorney fees -------------------------------------- 500.00
3,973.12
By failing to comply with the terms of the
ag1·eement a judgment was entered for:

Unpaid Principal --------------------------------2, 736.54
Interest to July 17, 1967 ____________________ 979.12
Attorney's fees ------------------------------------2, 000. 00
Court Costs ------------------------------------------ 20.00
5,735.66
It is thus clear that the agreed fee of $2,000.00
and not $2,500.00 was incorporated in the judgment. This fee was not based on an unpaid amount
of $2, 736.24 but was an agreed amount to pay part
of the respondent's reasonable legal expenses incur1·ed to collect $18,643.45 for which the appellants
were responsible under the fallowing provisions of
the guarantees:

i

"The undersigned further agrees that his
liability to you hereunder shall be primary
and that he (they) will pay to you on demand
without deduction by reason of offset, affirmative defense or counterclaim of said customer and without previous recourse by you
to your remedies against customer, togeth;er
with reasonable legal expenses as may be mcurred by you, all sums of money which may
be due or grow due for merchandise sold or
hereafter sold to the customer". (Emphasis
ours)
5

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because the record is not in chronological order, we believe it would be helpful to summarize by
dates the essential parts thereof.

May 4, 1965. Agreements of Guarantee sign-

ed by Appellants, Herscovitz and Ulmer. (R. 25-28)

April 5, 1966. Letter signed by T. C. Associates, Inc., Harry R. Ulmer, Jr., and Sam Herscovitz,
in which the corporation acknowledged that there
was due and owing $18,643.45 to the respondent
and all parties agreed to pay the same in four installments by June 30, 1966. (R. 23-24)
June 8, 1966. Complaint filed. (R. 1-2)

June 30, 1966. Judgment by default for $13,·

643.45, interest of $530.23, Attorney's fees of
$2,000.00 and costs. (R. 37)
July 7, 1966. Motion to Set Aside Default and
Vacate Judgment and Order Appointing Receiver.
( R. 14) Under Paragrah 7 of said Motion, Mr.
Saperstein alleged that the defendants, Ulmer and
Herscovitz, have a meritorious defense to all or a
portion of plaintiff's claim "by reason of the fact
that the guarantee alleged in plaintiff's complaint
extends, by its terms, to only a portion of the claim
sued by said plaintiff." (R. 13-14)
July 27, 1966. Order setting aside Default and

Vacating Judgment. In this Order the Court ruled
defendants had entered their appearance and order·
ed them to file an answer by August 2, 1966. (R. 20)
6
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July 28, 1966. Petition filed by T. C. Associates for an Arrangement under Chapter XI of the
Bankruptcy Act.
August 8, 1966. Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 21)
August 17, 1966. Answer of Defendants Harry Ulmer and Sam Herscovitz filed. (R. 29-34)
September 19, 1966. Stipulation of Alvin I.
Smith, Herschel Saperstein, Harry Ulmer and Sam
Herscovitz. (R. 51-53)
April 7, 1966 to February 27, 1967.
Payments against original principal
claim of ___________ ------------------------------------------ _$18, 643.45
April 7, 1966 ------------------ 5,000.00
September 20, 1966 ______ 3,000.00
October 6, 1966 ____________ 1,317.88
November 7, 1966 ________ 1,317.88
December 6, 1966 __________ 1,317.88
January 6, 1967 ____________ 1,317.88
February 7, 1967 __________ 1,317.88
February 7, 1967 __________ 1,317.88
15,907.28
$ 2,736.17
July 25, 1967. Motion to Set Aside Stipulation
to File Amended Answer and Counterclaim. (R.
43-47)
August 16, 1967. Affidavit of balance unpaid.
(R. 55-56)
August 17, 1967. Judgment. (R. 57-58)
7

STATEMENT OF POINTS
Point 1. The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' motion to amend its
answer ~nd counterclaim and set aside a stipulation
e;itered mto between the parties and their respective counsel made more than nine months after the
date of the stipulation.
Point 2. There was consideration whether the
stipulation be deemed to be an accord and satisfaction or a com promise and settlement of the claims
of the respective parties.
Point 3. All triable issues of fact had been re·
solved and there was no issue of law.
Point 4. The defenses of misjoinder or claims
and parties is inapplicable when, as here, there was
but a single claim by a single plaintiff.
Point 5. The Court had jurisdiction to enter
judgment.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANTS'
MOTION TO AMEND ITS ANSWER AND
COUNTERCLAIM AND SET ASIDE A STIPULATION ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE
PARTIES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNAFTER THE DATE OF THE STIPULATION.

Appellants are asking the Court to reverse the
Trial Court's denial of a Motion to Vacate the Stipulation and for leave to file a Counterclaim and
Amend Complaint (R. 43) after they have filed an
answer to a complaint asserting defenses and denying personal liability as to one of the counts a~d
after a Stipulation (R. 51) by the parties and then
8

counsel in which appellants admit personal liability
on all counts of the complaint.
Appellants contended that the case of Harmon
vs. Yeager, et al, 110 P. 2d 352, sets forth the applicable law on amendments in the State of Utah
and claim the facts in this case are on all fours with
the facts in the case here on Appeal.
We agree that the law cited therein is controlling. Appellants quoted from the court in Harman
vs. Yeager, supra, as follows:
"Viewing the motion therefore as a
speaking demurrer, when the answer was held
to be had and the defendants sought to amend,
they should have been granted such right
unless 'Under the facts admitted there was no
reasonable probability that they could state a
defense or make an issue on a matter material
to plaintiff's cause of action. (Emphasis added)
The court in reversing the judgment of the trial
court granting a judgment on the pleadings observed:
"We think these matters, while perhaps
not constituting a positive denial of plaintiff's
allegations, certainly cannot be said to be an
admission of plaintiff's claims. They manifest an effort to join issue, and when leave to
amend was asked the court should have granted the same."
In the instant case, after joinder of the issues,
appellants admitted liability on all counts of respon9

dent's complaint in the stipulation signed by the
parties and their attorneys, while in the case of Harman vs. Yeager, the pleadings, i.e. complaint and
original inarticluate answer, joined issue on matfors
which had not then been resolved.
Since all of respondent's allegations were admitted in the Stipulation there was no reasonable
probability that appellants could state a defense and
the Motion to Amend was properly denied. In fact,
in the present case appellants had an opportunity
to and did deny liability as to the E & B Carpet Mills
account in their answer ( R. 32), while in the Stipulation (R. 51) they admit personal liability to that
debt. Appellants should not be allowed to constantly
traverse their own personal liability to that debt.
Appellants should not be allowed to constantly tra·
verse their own position in order to suit their then
present desires.
None of the cases cited by appellants involved
the granting of a Motion to Amend following the
entering of judgment pursuant to a stipulation
which was entered into after the suit had commenc·
ed, issues joined, and the case was ready for
trial and research has revealed no such cases to re·
spondent.
Further the additional cases listed by appellant
are distinguishable as to the facts and the law re·
lied on.
Respondent agrees with the geenral principles
10

enumerated in Johnson vs. Brinkerhoff, et al, 57
P. 2d 1132, but submits that the sentence immediately following the quotation cited by appellants is
more applicable to the facts here on appeal:
"On the other hand it has been said that
well-established principles and precedents are
not to be lightly set aside, and that amendments are to be allowed in furtherance of
justice and not as a reward for indifference
or neglect, or where prejudicial to the rights
of the adverse party or placing him at an unfari disadvantage. Further, the liberality exercised in allowing amendments is greatest at
the time the law suit is commenced and decreases as the suit progresses, and the rule
granting amendments changes to the disadvantage of applicant upon each new amendment being allowed."
A settlement by stipulation is a termination of
litigation and highly favored in the law and once
executed by the parties and their counsel, liberality
toward amendments ceases, for litigation has ceased.
The case of Johnson vs. Peck, 63 P. 2d 253,
stands for the proposition that a trial court does not
abuse its discretion in refusing to allow amendment
after trial and submission of the case. The court in
Johnson vs. Jeck, supra, observed:
HThe policy of the law is toward liberality in the allowance of amendments and to regard them with favor to the end that the real
controversy bet~ee~ the parties may_ be se!r
tled. The liberality is greatest at the ti~e smt
is commenced and decreases as the smt pro11

gresses. The Trial Court has a broad discretion in the matter of amendments to pleadings. 49 C. J. 466, 520; Johnson vs. Brinkel'hoff (Utah) 57 P. (2d) 1132. Where amendments to pleadings are offered so long after
trial and submission of the case, and after
decision of the court is announced, the parties
offering such amendments have no standing
to complaint if their offer is refused. The
Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the filing of such paper."
Since the compromise and settlement of a claim
reduced to writing, signed by the parties and their
counsel and made part of the record is as much a
final disposition of litigation as a judgment after
trial and highly favored in the law "to secure the
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action" Rule 1 ( d), the Trial Court has not abused
its discretion and appellants have no standing to
complain under the rationale of Johnson vs. Peck,
supra.
Appellants cite the case of Hancock vs. Luke,
et al, 148 P. 452. In that case, however, immediately
after the court ruled sustaining plaintiff's Motion
for Judgment, defendant's counsel asked for leave
to amend his answer.
Respondent would agree that a request for leave
to amend at that stage of the proceedings was timely. However, immediately following the portion
quoted by appellants, the court observed:
"Nor can we conceive how any one can
12

say in advance that in this case at least a partial defense may not be set forth by a proper
arnendment to the answer. Nor can we see
how it can successfully be contended that the
motion for leave to amend was not timely
made, or that prejudice or undue delay will
result if allowed." (Emphasis added.)
In the instant case not only was the Motion to
Amend not timely in that it was made one year after
the original answer, almost 10 months after the stipulation had been executed and the appellants had
made payments thereunder, but the trial court before which appellant made its Motion to Amend and
Vacate the Stipulation could say in advance that no
defense could be interposed, for appellants had admitted respondent's entire case in the stipulation
( R. 51) and on previous occasions. In addition, respondent would be greatly prejudiced in that it had
relied to its detriment on the executed stipulation
for an extended period of time without proceeding
to trial on the merits.
POINT II
THERE WAS CONSIDERATION WHETHER
THE STIPULATION BE DEEMED TO BE AN
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION OF A COMP R 0 M I S E AND SETTLEMENT OF THE
CLAIMS OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES.

Appellant quotes 1 C.J.S.-Accord and Satisfaction, Section 4, Page 473. This section contains in
addition the following:
"This is all that the law requires by way
of consideration, and broadly speaking, whereever a creditor receives from a substituted
13

~

I

contract a distinct benefit which he otherwise
would not have had, such benefit is sufficient
to uphold the accord and satisfaction."
P. 4 75 - "Where the claim or demand
constitutes the subject matter of the accord is
a disputed one, or unliquidated, the mere adjustment of the dispute or agreement of accord affords, of itself, sufficient consideration for the accord, whether or not the latter
has been actually executed and satisfaction
had; and it 1nay be added that it is ordinarily
the only consideration in such case." ( Emphasis added)
Respondent agrees with the principles stated
above, and assuming the stipulation was an accord
and satisfaction, submits that there was consideration within the meaning of those principles last
above referred to.
Appellant cannot now maintain that the claim
was not disputed, for in answer to respondent's complaint, appellants denied personal liability as to the
E and B Carpet account ( R. 31) , entered in to a
stipulation admitting personal liability as to both
accounts (R. 51) and then after default under the
terms of the stipulation sought to set aside the stipulation on the ground that the personal guarantee
was made as to the Bailey-Schmitz account and not
to E & B Carpets. (This is the same disputed matter
raised by appellant prior to the execution of the stipulation). Thus since there was a real dispute, the
settlement thereof constituted "sufficient consider·
ation for the accord". 1 C.J.S., 475.
14

The paragraph above stated was followed by
the court in Laws vs. Parker Petroleum Company,
237 S.W. 2d 398 (1951) which observed:
"An accord is an agreement for the discharge of an obligation. The execution of this
agreement is a satisfaction. Such an agreement must be based upon a valid consideration. The settlement of a claim, liquidated or
unliquidated which has been disputed in good
faith is of itself sufficient consideration to
support the agreement." (Emphasis added)
Appellants cite Metropolitan State Bank vs.
Cox, et al, 302 P. 2d 188, for the proposition that an
accord entered into as a result of a mistake of one
of the parties results in a lack of meeting of the
minds and hence an absence of consideration.
We submit that the following facts present in
this case demonstrate a distinction from the above
case in that no mistake of fact or law exists.
In spite of the fact that counsel for Appellant,
and Appellant Herscovitz, by affidavit (R. 46-47)
attempted to convince Judge Jeppson and are now
urging to this Court that the stipulation and particularly the substance thereof was entered into
without full disclosure of the facts to counsel, the
record and the background, prior to the stipulation,
demonstrate that from the very beginning Appellants have had every opportunity to protect their
legal rights. The Trial Court in refusing to vacate
the stipulation quickly reached this conclusion after
having reviewed the file :
15

"You are not telling me your clients made
a mistake. In fact you say they failed to communicate to their attorney. I cannot get into
the question of how much a client tells his attorney. I have got to assume the attorneys are
fully informed by their clients." (R. 70, L.
17-21)

The following events demonstrate that the client
had full opportunity to advise their counsel and .
everything points to the fact that they had previously advised counsel of every defense they might have
had.
Before the letter of April 5, 1965, which was
signed by all of the parties, a full discussion of the
claim of $18,643.45, plus attorney's fees, was had
with respondent's counsel. Prior to June 13, 1966
when Mr. Vlahos was incapacitated, on June 1, 1966,
he (Vlahos) after telephoning, wrote counsel for
respondent. We quote applicable parts thereof:
"This will confirm your conversation
with me by phone on May 26th, 1966 - pursuant to said conversation please be advised
that in addition to the $5,000.00 already paid
on this account an additional $5,000.00 will
be paid on or before May 31st or June 1st,
1966, and an additional $5,000.00 on or before June 30th, 1966 an dthe balance of $3,643.45 will be paid by July 15, 1966."
We must assume that at this time his client,
Mr. Herscovitz, had discussed the facts of the case
with him or he would not have taken it upon himself to acknowledge this obligation.
16

Appellants' former counsel, Mr. Saperstein, in
his motion to set aside the default and vacate judgment (R. 13-14) sets out in great detail a summary
of the defenses the parties defendant had to the
claim. All of the reasons now being advanced by
present counsel to vacate the stipulation were summarized in this motion and were discussed informally by Mr. Saperstein with respondent's counsel.
The issues raised were :
1. The guarantee applied only to a portion of
the claim.
2. The guarantee did not include the Evans
and Black Carpet Mills account.
3. The written garantee could be modified by
an oral agreement.
4. The right to attorney's fees.
5. The right to setoffs.
Although respondent's counsel did not agree
that legally the guarantors could prevail either in
law or fact on the above issues, he did agree that defendents should have their day in court by having
the court vacate the judgment.
The day after the above motion was filed the
corporation represented by Mr. Saperstein filed a
petition for an Arrangement under Chapter XI of
the Bankruptcy Act; under the plan proposed, the
entire claim was to have been paid by April 1, 1967.
In addition, the mistake of fact purportedly
17

made by appellants and supposedly not communicated to their attorney, is that the stipulation obligated them to pay "in excess of their guaranty" (R.
67) ; this was specifically raised by their attorney.
In answer to the complaint their attorney pleaded
an affirmative defense to part of the claim when he
observed:
"It was further represented by plaintiff
to these defendants at the time of the execution of said agreement of guarantee that the
only factored account to which said agreement
of guarantee would apply was that of BaileySchmitz." (R. 31)
Defendants' counsel thereafter urged that there
was no reason to argue the case under the Motion
for Summary Judgment or to set the case down for
trial because payment would be made in due course,
and under any circumstances the individual appellants would agree to make the payments as later arranged in the stipulation and could then recoup
them from the dividends paid by the bankruptcy
court. When the final draft of the stipulation was
prepared by appellant's counsel, it was distinctly
understood by all of the parties that all of the above
issues were being resolved in the same manner as
they could have been either at the conclusion of a
hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, or
on a settlement approved at a pretrial.

In order that there could be no misunderstanding of the terms of settlement, a conference was ar18

1

ranged in the offices of Mr. Ulmer at which meeting
both appellants and both counsel were present. It is
true that Mr. Herscovitz argued at great length
against the final agreement, which was reached
after a half day session. So that there would be no
question that the stipulation conformed with the
understanding of the principals involved, both counsel insisted that Ulmer and Herscovitz sign the same
individually and be named as parties to the stipulation.
Only after they had made payments according
to the terms of the stpulation from September, 1966
to February, 1967 (R. 56) did appellants seek to
avoid the stipulation. After Mr. Saperstein withdrew having advised them that they were obligated
to pay the balance under the terms of the stipulation,
if they wished to avoid the entry of a judgment
against them ( R. 65-66) , through new counsel they
asked the trial court to believe that they entered
into the stipulation under a mistake of fact, again
traversing their previous position.
A reading of the transcript indicates that Judge
Jeppson was particularly interested in being advised
what new matters existed and could be asserted in
an amended answer. We submit that neither by
affidavit nor by the responsive answers of Mr. Vlahos has a single new issue being raised that was not
previously raised and discussed and then resolved
by the stipulation.
The purpose in attempting to set aside the stip19

ulation was so that the judgment provided therein
could not be entered. The provisions of Rule 60 (b)
therefore apply. Judge Jeppson so applied them,
but appellants have failed to supply any reason such
as mistake, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or any other customary ground. In
view of the record, the trial court's position should
not be reversed for there can be no mistake of fact
claimed by one who asserts the same defense before
and after the execution of a stipulation.
With the principles cited by appellant in Brown
vs. Equitable Life Association, 72 P. (2d) 1060, we
fully agree, but the court further observed:

"There must be consideration for the
agreement. Settlement of an unliquidated or
disputed claim, where the parties are apart in
good faith presents such consideration." (Emphasis added. )
The court reasoned that there was not accord and
satisfaction because the claim "was filed and paid
in accordance with the demand with no dispute". On
the other hand, they observed that:
"If a dispute between the parties had
arisen regarding this matter of partial and
liability, and was before the court, and the
plaintiff had then agreed to the settlement of
July 2, 1934, it would have been an accord
and satisfaction."
Again, we agree with the general principles
quoted by appellants in Ralph A. Badger & Co. vs.
20

Fidelity Building and Loan Assn., 75 P. 2d 669,
but the court again repeated the following rule:
"There must be consideration for the
agreement. Settlement of an unliquidated or
disputed claim where the parties are apart in
good faith presents such consideration." (Emphasis added.)
In the Badger case the court states that plaintiff
relied upon information given it by defendant and
"until it received information other than that furnished by defendant, it had no basis upon which to
predicate a dispute."

We have pointed out previously that there was
a genuine dispute, contested issues pleaded and a
settlement thereof by stipulation. It pushes credibility to believe that appellant could now urge the
parties had no good faith dispute as to the amount
of the claim owed by appellants to respondent and
the court should find consideration in the settlement
of a disputed claim.
Respondent submits that the stipulation was
really a compromise and settlement of a disputed
claim and that the line of cases under this category
are controlling rather than cases involving accord
and satisfaction. In Achtel vs. Lieberman, 141 N.Y.
S. 2d 750 ( 1956) the court observed:
"To permit settlement so made to be vacated except upon a showing of good cause
therefor, such as fraud, collusion, mistake, accident or some other ground of the same na21

ture - would open the door to possible abuse
and make litigation interminable-. The follow.in.g la?guage of the case of Kaipinshi vs.
Kaipins~i, 130 N.Y.S. 2d 364, 366, is aptly
persuasive here:
'The plaintiff is bound by the stipulation
and it is valid and enforceable. The courts
look with favor upon agreements and stipulations to end litigation, and will enforce them
if possible -. In fact, it is the duty of the
court to enforce the stipulation in this case'.''
In Opitz vs. Hayden, 17 Wash. 2d, 347, 135 P.
2d 819, the court observed as to compromise and
settlement:
"The real consideration which each party
receives under such a compromise is, according to some authorities, not the sacrifice of
the right, but the settlement of the dispute."
Utah makes a distinction without real significance between accord and satisfaction and compromise and settlement in that with both if there is a
disputed claim, the consideration required is supplied through the settlement of that dispute. Brown
vs. Equitable Life Assoc. Soc., Supra.
Under either accord and satisfaction or compromise and settlement since there was a good faith
settlement of a dispute, that settlement presents the
required consideration.
POINT III
ALL TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACT HAD BEEN
RESOLVED AND THERE WAS NO ISSUE OF
LAW.

Appellant cites Bauer vs. Pacific Financing Co.,
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383 P. 2d 347, for the proposition that on a Motion
to dismiss doubt should be resolved in favor of the
pleader in order to allow him an opportunity to present his proof. We submit this rule is inapplicable
when, as here, the parties and their counsel have
entered into a stipulation resolving disputed matters
arising out of the filing of a complaint and answer
thereto. Where the parties have resolved a dispute
and provided in a stipulation that if a default occurs, "the court may enter, without notice to the defendants, judgment against defendants", (R. 51)
the reason for the principal has terminated along
with all disputes arising out of the litigation. At this
point a new principle emerges which is to encourage
a termination of hostilities by settlement short of
trial. Achtel vs. Lieberman, supra.
Appellants then maintain that since they denied all of the allegations contained in respondent's
complaint ( R. 29-34) and specifically denied the
guaranty of any amount on the E & B Carpet Mill
account, there is therefore a triable issue of fact but
they ignore the facts, once again, in their argument
in that subsequent to their denial they and their attorney signed a stipulation admitting all contested
matters (R. 51) and made payments acknowledging
that agreement of five ( 5) months. Then being unable to further perform they, through new counsel,
sought to set aside the stipulation and amend their
answer ( R. 43) on the ground that they were mistaken as to their liability as against E & B Carpet
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Mills and failed to inform their counsel of the facts
obligating themselves to pay in "excess of the guar-'
anty". (R. 67)
Respondent fails to see how the court can believe that appellants were mistaken as to facts purportedly limiting their liability when that defense
was specifically raised in their answer. (R. 31)
Appellant further maintain on Page 25 of their
brief that "unless Bailey-Schmitz is forced to become a party in their action that justice will not be
obtained and the result would be unconcionable because the appellants would have to bring legal action
in the State of California against Bailey-Schmitz
Qn their setoff when all of said issues should be
handled at one time in an effort to avoid multiple
suits." This contention is unsound on its face for
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 13 (j) provides:
'". . . any claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim which have been asserted against an
assignor, at the time of or before notice of
such assignment, may be asserted against his
assignee, to the extent that such claim, counterclaim or cross-claim does not exceed recovery upon the claim of the assignee."
Therefore, the right of set-off could have been
determined had the case proceeded to trial. The fact
that the stipulation provided that appellants reserved rights of setoff against Bailey-Schmitz is not material as against respondent for the personal guarantee acknowledged and admitted by appellants (R.
51) provided that all payments would be made "on
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demand without deduction by reason of set off, defense, or counterclaim." (R. 25) That provision in
the stipulation was merely a compromise by respondent, for had the case gone to trial appellants would
have been barred from asserting a setoff against respondent by reason of their express waiver in the
guaranty.
Thus there was no triable issue of law or fact
before the trial court and appellants' Motion to file
an amended answer and counterclaim was properly
dismissed.
POINT IV
THE D E F E N S E S OF MISJOINDER OF
CLAIMS AND PARTIES IS INAPPLICABLE
WHEN, AS HERE, THERE WAS BUT A
SINGLE CLAIM BY A SINGLE PLAINTIFF.

The case cited by appellants as controlling is
distinguishable in Fact and principle from the case
presented on appeal.
The case of Stank vs. Jones, 404 P. 2d 364
(1965) is factually distinguishable in that it involved seven (7) distinct claimants with twelve (12)
independent causes of action having unrelated facts
who assigned their claims to the plaintiff for purposes of suit and collection. The assignors retained
a two-third interest in the amount to be collected.
In the instant case respondent-plaintiff purchased the accounts receivable from the assignors
who retained no interest therein (Rl, 8, 9, 25, 27).
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Appellants' liability is not based on two separate
claims but on appellants' personal guarantee for
payment for "all merchandise sold or which is hereafter sold. . .. by you (respondent herein) and for
any one or more of your FACTORED ACCOUNTS."
(R. 25)
Specifically, the judgment appealed from was
against appellants in their individual capacity as a
result of their personal guarantees and the objection as to misjoinder of plaintiffs and claims is inapplicable here, there being only one plaintiff with
one claim arising out of a single guarantee. (see
pa. 5 of complaint, R. 2)
An analogous, but distinguishable, situation is
that of a plaintiff who purchased two notes both
made by the same maker, but having two separate
payees. There is no doubt that a holder in due course
of both notes could file a single complaint against
the single defendant-maker by stating in a complaint
two counts. The liability and the right to proceed in
a single complaint is analogous to respondent-plaintiff's claim against defendant, T. C. Associates. On
the other hand the case here on appeal arises out of
a judgment against appellants in their individual
capacity and is not predicated upon two claims, but
a single claim based on their personal guarantee for
payment of "any and all merchandise sold or which
is hereafter sold ... " ( R. 25)
In essence, the action was one brought by re26

spondent-plaintiff against the guarantors of a running account debt.
Not only may Stank vs. Jones, supra. be distinguished on the facts, but it is also distinguishable
on principle.
The majority opinion in Stank vs. Jones, supra.
struck at the evil of allowing multiple claimants to
avoid the rule on permissive joinder by assignment
to an assignee for collection. The court observed:
"Here we have an action wherein the
plaintiff, an assignee for collection, appears
to invoke Rule 18(a) 3 and circumvent Rule
20(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Seven different claimants have assigned
twelve different, distinct, and unrelated
claims to the plaintiff. Plaintiff is to retain
one-third of any moneys collected and the
assignor is to receive the remaining twothirds. Under such circumstances should
plaintiff be permitted, as he has done here,
to join all of these claims against the defendant in one action? We think not. Yet, it can
be argued that, inasmuch as the plaintiff is
the real party in interest, he may prosecute
this action by virtue of Rule 18 (a) and join
therein all claims, both legal and equitable,
which his assignors might have against the
defendant. Such a conclusion cannot be tolerated.
(Footnote 3) "If the assignee sues at law, he is turned out of court, and if the assignor sues in equity,
he is turned out also ... The true rule undoubtedly
is that which prevails i nthe court of equity, that
he who has the right is the person to pursue the
remedy. We have adopted this rule. First Report of
the Commissioner on Practice and Pleadings, N.Y.
(1848) 124." (Emphasis added.)
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"Obviously, the seven assignors could not
have joined as plaintiffs and asserted their
diverse and unrelated claims in one action
against the defen~an~. Why, then, should they
be allowed to do md1rectely what they could
not do directely? The answer is that they
should not."
In the Stank case the seven unrelated claimants
assigned one-third ( 1/3 ) of their interests in claims
against the debtor-defendant who had not executed
a personal guarantee to pay any and all claims assigned to the assignee, thereby avoiding the requirement of Rule 20(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that multiple plaintiffs "may join in one action ... if they assert any right to relief ... in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurance, or series of transactions or occurances... "
In the instant case there was no attempt to avoid
the rigors of Rule 20 (a), nor is that Rule herein
applicable for there was but one plaintiff with but
one claim arising out of the execution of a personal
guarantee and thus the principle set forth in the
majority opinion is neither thwarted, nor is it applicable.
In his concuring opinion, Justice Henroid expressed the fear that an assignee might gather up
separate and unrelated claims against a single defendant forcing him to defend them all in a single
proceeding and for a single filing fee. Justice Hen·
roid observed in Stank vs. Jones, supra.:
"If this case were decided otherwise, a
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person could have one claim by assignment,
and then could go around gathering up ten
others against a defendant, all unrelated, and
force the defendant to meet all of them in one
suit, with a single filing fee and before a
single jury."
In the instant case, as noted previously, there
is but one claim by a single claimant and the rationale of the concurring opinion of avoiding a situation
where one is forced to meet many unrelated claims
brought by an assignee with a isngle filing fee is
not applicable for liability arose out of the execution
of a personal guarantee in favor of a single factor,
respondent herein.
As to appellants' argument that the assignors
should be joined to avoid irreparable injury due to
their right of set off against Bailey-Schmitz, respondent submits that this is without merit on two
grounds.
First, we have previously argued the significance of Rule 13 (j) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore since the right to allowances of
the setoff against Bailey-Schmitz could have been
heard, had the case proceeded to trial, without joining Bailey-Schmitz, the appellants cannot claim irreparable injury.
Second, appellants specifically waived their
right of setoff and counterclaim in their personal
guarantee (R. 25-28) and if the case were to proceed to trial the matter could not be heard for that
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reason. The right of setoff preserved in the stipulation was merely a compromise made by respondent
and if said stipulation were to be vacated as suggested by appellants the guarantee would then govern,
barring the assertion of said setoff.
Further, had respondent sought leave to add
the assignors as addition al parties the court would
properly have denied the request. The court in Yark
Blouse Corp. vs. Kaplowitz Bros., Inc., 97 A. 2d 465
(1953) observed:
"In this jurisdiction an assignee of an
open account may sue for the same in his own
name, and rule 17 (a) of the trial court requires that every action shall be brought in
the name of the real party in interest. When
substantive law gives an assignee the right
to sue in his own name and rule of court requires suit by the real party in interest, action on an assigned claim must be brought
by the assignee in his own name. Having sold
or assigned its claim against defendant, plaintiff no longer had a right to enforce that
claim. Fashion Fan had the right by substantive law to enforce the claim and was therefore the real party in interest. Not only was
Fashion Fan the real party in interest, it was
an indispensable party. When the rights of an
assignee will be affected by an action, the assignee in an indipensable party....
"At trial plaintiff asked leave to add as
additional parties plaintiff the stockholders of
plaintiff corporation. This request was properly denied. Since the corporation .had sold its
claim, its stockholders had no rights thereto . ... " (Emphasis added.)
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It has also been held that an action brought by
the assignor of a complete assignment of a chose in
action should be dismissed since it was not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. Bench
vs. State Automobile & Casulty Under. etc., 408 P.
2d 899 (1965).
In conformity with the above the court in
Northwest Oil & Refining Co. vs. Honolulu Oil Corp.
195 F supra 281 ( 1961), observed:
"Plaintiff, having assigned all its rights,
title and interest in the contract, no longer
has any interest therein and may not accordingly maintain the action ... Where all rights
under a contract have been transferred the
assignee is the real party in inte:t;-est."
Rule 17 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that every action shall be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest.
The purpose of the real party in interest rule
is set forth in Moore's Federal Practice, vol 3A, p.
271 # 1709 as follows:
"The primary purpose of the real party
in interest provision was to change the common law rule that an action upon an assigned
chose in action had to be prosecuted in the
name of the assignor."
The cases above quoted are in accord with the
principle that the assignee of a complete chose in
action is the real party in interest and that a suit
brought in the name of the assignor should be dis31

missed and leave sought to join the as~
be denied for the reason that the assig1
has any interest in the matter.
If the facts here on appeal involveo , _
al assignee for collection a different result migia
warranted, but since it involved a co·
ment of a chose in action the courts a
observed in Moore's Federal Practice, "
272-3, # 17.09 as follows:

"'The federal courts, in construing the
real party in interest provisj - ·,, of various
state codes, and all of the stati
JC' •,
r
'
struing their own provisions, r
accord in holding that the um
signee of a complete chose in at:
party in interest and suit must
hi.(] name." (Emphasis added.)
Moore P. 279
"Whether an assignee fo1·
L~•i on1y,
who has a duty of accountah 1
to his assignor, can sue in his own na'.
mder a real
party in interest provision hc.w aused some
variance of opinion among the cuurts."
Since the respondent was the J.nqualified assignee of a complete chose in action, the owner of
the legal title and beneficial interest to the exclusion
of the assignor he is the real party in interest with
the meaning of Rule 17 (a) of th1~ Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and entitled to sue 1 his own name.
1

1

Therefore, since an action, brought by the assignors would have been dismissed, Northwest Oil &
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;vs. Honolulu Oil Corp. supra; leave to
· ";inors as parties plaintiff would properdenied, York Blouse Corp. vs. Kaplonc., 97 A 2d 465 ( 1953) and the setoff
dist Bailey-Schmitz could have been heard under
· "''=' ·,·:.:, rrf the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
· ., ;g the assignors, appellants' claim of
, . -~· 1..,rJUry is unfounded in fact and in law.
,L

POINT V
THE COUIIT HAD JURISDICTION TO ENTER
JUDGMP.T'.'.1\·
·. t'(Lf) '):;

out previously this action was com... u·' ~ ':' 1 i:;filing of a Complaint. Any prior de. < 1 ·IClJ:Was cured by defendant's general ap1
,
• · '·
f3-14), the Order dated July 27, 1966,
'ne Answer filed August 17, 1966 (R.
. .

'fl:

,,, : ' ·> rr(\';'

"f

See i:. ·." .~~:r vs. Pollock, 20 U. 371, 59 P. 87;
Kramer vs. ·''ton, 72 U. 1, 268 P. 1029; Cooke vs.
Cooke, 67 l•. ~'lil, 248 P. 83.
tY.

CONCLUSION

The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in
denying appellaI;J.ts' motion to set aside the stipulation and for leave to file an amended answer and
counterclaim fo0 the following reasons more fully
enumerated he~· ..tofore: The Motion was not timely
made and ~f g~anted would be prejudicial to the
rights of r~spondent and would discourage settlement of litigation; there was good consideration in
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the settlement of a disputed claim; there was no
triable issues of fact and law for they had all been
resolved in the settlement of the disputed claim after
joinder of issue in the complaint and answer thereto; the defenses of misjoinder of claims and parties
are inapplicable because there was but one claim by
a single claimant; and any defect in jurisdiction
was cured by appellants' general appearances and
answer to respondent's complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
AL VIN I. SMITH
1309 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for
Respondent
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